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Abstract 
Securing nuclear materials is paramount. State physical protection systems provide a single system 
for planning, coordination, monitoring and implementation of the technical and organizational measures for 
the timely detection of unauthorized activities and prevent them. Physical protection should be provided at 
all stages of design, construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities, as well as any 
handling of nuclear materials and radioactive substances. 
The aim of this work is to create a hypothetical object, with which you can get the necessary data to 
assess the effectiveness with using the software "Vega-2." 
 
Introduction 
Technical means allow providing early detection of unauthorized violator, control authorized access 
to an object, monitoring the situation, so as part of a physical protection system they have a special role. 
Selection of the optimal composition of elements of PPS for a particular object in the design process is 
carried out through a systematic approach using a variety of performance criteria the system will perform its 
primary function. In this evaluation of the effectiveness of PPS is mandatory. 
Evaluating the effectiveness of the security system is based on quantitative or qualitative 
determination of the ability of the threats identified in the analysis phase of vulnerability. 
The work was aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of PPS is to evaluate the ability to provide 
security for physical protection from external and internal threats, taken from the analysis of the 
vulnerability of nuclear objects, by the repression of unauthorized violator. 
Development 
The main objectives in assessing the effectiveness of PPS of nuclear objects are: 
• ТНОЧЭТПвТЧР ЭСО ОlОЦОЧЭs ШП PPS, ШЯОrМШЦТЧР ЭСО ШППОЧНОr аСШ Тs ЦШsЭ lТФОlв ЭШ ЭСОПЭ ШП ЧЮМlОКr 
materials (NM) or sabotage at nuclear facilities (NF) of the object;  
• CШЧsТНОrКЭТШЧ sМОЧКrТШs ЯТШlКЭШr КТЦОН КЭ sЭОКlТЧР Шr sКЛШЭКРО ШП ЧЮМlОКr ЦКЭОrТКls КЧН ЭШ ТНОЧЭТПв 
the most probable of them;  
• IНОЧЭТПТМКЭТШЧ ШП ЯЮlЧОrКЛТlТЭТОs ОбТsЭТЧР PPS ПШrЦКllв ЦООЭ ЭСО rОqЮТrОЦОЧЭs ОsЭКЛlТsСОН ТЧ ЭСО 
regulations;  
• AЧКlвsТs ШП ЭСО МКЮsОs ШП ЯЮlЧОrКЛТlТЭТОs ТЧ PPS; 
• AssОssЦОЧЭ ШП ЭСО lТФОlТСШШН ШП МОrЭКТЧ prОЯОЧЭТЯО КМЭТШЧs ЯТШlКЭШrs РЮКrН ПШrМО КМЭТЧР Шn the alarm 
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when internal and external threats;  
• CСШТМО ШП ШpЭТЦКl НОsТРЧ НОМТsТШЧs НЮrТЧР ЭСО МrОКЭТШЧ КЧН ТЦprШЯОЦОЧЭ ШП PPS;  
• PrОpКrКЭТШЧ ШП prШpШsКls ПШr ЭСО КНЦТЧТsЭrКЭТШЧ ШП ЧЮМlОКr ШЛУОМЭs МШЦЦКЧН (НТrОМЭТЧР) ШП ЭСО 
security forces of nuclear objects to improve PPS and its individual structural elements, including decisions 
to optimize tactics of the security forces. 
The main tool in assessing the effectiveness of PPS nuclear facility is a specially designed software 
"Vega-2." With this program you can assess and identify the full picture of the effectiveness of PPS, identify 
weaknesses, to reduce the likelihood of human error assumptions in the calculations and to simplify the 
procedure of effectiveness evaluation itself. 
"Vega-2" software performs the following functions: 
1. Construction of a formalized description of the object. 
2. Automatic detection of possible ways to target the offending 
3. Determining the effectiveness of PPS for each objective in two ways (analytical and simulation) 
4. Representation of results of the assessment in the following ways: 
• НТsplКвТЧР ЭСО ЧЮЦОrТМКl ЯКlЮОs ШП pОrПШrЦКЧМО ТЧНТМКЭШrs PPS; 
• МСКrЭТЧР pШssТЛlО аКвs ЯТШlКЭШr; 
• НТsplКвТЧР ТЧПШrЦКЭТШЧ КЛШЮЭ МrТЭТМКl pКЭСs; 
• rОМШrНТЧР rОsЮlЭs ШП ЭСО КssОssЦОЧЭ. 
For the most complete presentation and analysis of results of working "Vega-2" software the 
hypothetical nuclear facility was developed in. 
As the object of scientific research we  selected reactor - nuclear facility for the production of energy 
in a given mode and conditions of use, is located within a defined project area on which to carry out this 
purpose nuclear reactor complex and the necessary systems, apparatus, equipment and facilities with the 
necessary working personnel . 
The object has a driveway and a railway track. Driveway is the most commonly used way to transport 
personnel to the job site. Railway track used to deliver fresh fuel and spent fuel sent to companies processing 
or disposal. The enterprise has an emergency exit. 
The 3D - the scheme of hypothetical nuclear object 
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1 - AKPP and LKPP; 
2- Reactor building; 
3 - Management point; 
4 - Building of the main warehouse; 
5 - AKPP-2; 
6 - Observation tower. 
Currently, the design of various security systems are widely used methods of 3D modeling. We used 
this action in order to:  
1. Visual representation of selected hypothetical object;  
2. Visual effect with a detailed examination of the smallest details and arrangement of elements 
considered;  
3. Obtain effective results and rapid elimination of defects, if found. 
In this case, 3D modeling in the design of the various systems used for visualization of using 
software "Vega -2." The module is connected to the database by type of physical barriers and graphic 
description of the object module. Formalized description includes a description of the structure of the object 
and the location of items of physical protection as well as data from time to time to overcome the offender 
physical barriers and the likelihood of its detection times extension of the security forces to the borders of 
the physical protection of the offender and the times of movement of the security forces in sections. 
Results 
In order to create an effective system of physical protection in the established model visualization 
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hypothetical object in the 3D editor was built. With it analyzes the characteristics of the relative position of 
buildings, protected areas in the facility, placement of nuclear materials, elements of the complex of 
technical means of physical protection. Visibility resulting materials allows us to consider the possible route 
of offenders, changing tactics unauthorized actions in the restructuring of PPS. 
Conclusion 
On the basis of a formalized description of the object calculated module automatically determines the 
probable ways intruder (action script). For each path depending on the user evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the method automatically generates a graph of the situation or conducted simulation penetration offending 
object. 
As a result of using three-dimensional graphics created specific hypothetical object, which gives a 
detailed description of all the necessary data to assess the effectiveness of using the software "Vega-2." 
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